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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF A CRIME'S CONSEQUENCES ON VERDICT:
TYPE II ERRORS AND INFORMATION DISTORTION

by
BRIAN JAY PERLMAN
University of New Hampshire, September, 1979
An understanding of our justice system can be enhanced
through knowledge of how judges and jurors process courtroom
information to arrive at their decisions.

In the area of

juror decision making, several psychological models have been
suggested.

Kaplan and Kemmerick (1975) and Ostrom, Werner

and Saks (1978), for example, claim that verdicts can be
predicted by combining the subjective weightings given to
various pieces of trial information.

Landy and Aronson (1969)

posit that affect laden factors influence courtroom outcomes.
The present research attempts to extend the work of
Vidmar (1972) and Kerr (1978) in utilizing a Type I-Type II
error approach to juror decision making.

A Type I error is

defined here as convicting an innocent defendant while a
Type II error is defined as acquitting a guilty one.

Jurors

concerned more with avoiding a Type I error are predicted to
process information in a way favorable to the defendant and
be more acquittal oriented, while those more concerned with

avoiding a Type II error are expected to process information
in a way unfavorable to the defendant and be more conviction
oriented.

Various factors may affect a juror's Type I-Type

II error orientation; the nature of the crime, characteris
tics of the defendant or characteristics of the victim.
This study attempted to vary jurors' Type II error
orientation by manipulating the severity of crime consequences.
One hundred and forty-four mock jurors were presented one of
two versions of a simulated, written courtroom case.

In one

condition, transcripts described an auto theft (mild crime
condition) while in the other they described an auto thefthit and run case (severe crime condition).

The auto theft-

hit and run crime incorporated the auto theft crime.

In the

act of stealing the car, the perpetrator ran over a mother
and her daughter, killing the mother and paralyzing the
daughter from the waist down.

All other details about the

crime and all courtroom testimony were highly similar across
conditions.

Thus, while the auto theft-hit and run crime

carried a harsher penalty, there was little objective reason
to find the defendant guiltier in this, condition.

The crime

severity factor was crossed with two evidence manipulations
and with gender of juror (i.e., sex of subjects).
Two types of findings were reported; hypothesis test
ing and model testing results.

The hypothesis of the experi

ment was that jurors in the severe crime condition would
report the Type II error as having been higher, distort informa
tion in a way unfavorable to the defendant and be more guilt
x

oriented.

(They rendered verdicts of greater guilt, found

the defendant to be more guilty and to be more likely to
have committed the crime.)
with these predictions.

Results were highly consistent

Jurors' responses to "reactions to

the crime" measures showed that jurors did react more nega
tively to the more severe crime, an indirect indication of a
higher Type II error orientation.

Information distortion in

the predicted direction was indicated by jurors' assessments
of their emotional reactions toward the defendant and some
what by their self reported reasons for their verdict.

Both

were more unfavorable toward the defendant in the severe
crime condition.

Most importantly, jurors in the severe

crime condition were clearly more guilt oriented on all three
measures of verdict.

In fact, crime severity had stronger

effects than manipulations of actual evidence.
Model testing was attempted with examination of correla
tion matrices and regression path coefficients.
tentative support for the predicted model.

There was

Emotional reactions

toward the defendant seemed to mediate the relationship between
Type II errors and verdict.
Results suggest that a Type I-Type II error model may
provide a useful description of some important juror decision
making processes.

It appears likely that further research can

build upon these findings.

I. INTRODUCTION
American legal principle requires that a verdict be
based upon objective consideration of admissible evidence.
However, juridic decision making is a human process full of
subjectivity.

The adversarial nature of the courtroom allows

two sided interpretation of trial information and provides
jurors freedom to weigh the importance of each piece of evi
dence.

Because of the latitude afforded jurors, legal out

comes are not only affected by evidence but also by the way
in which evidence is processed.
Psychological research has focused on the subjective
nature of the juridic process by examining the effects of
extralegal factors

(any factor affecting verdict besides ad

missible evidence) on the evidence-verdict relationship
(Gerbasi, Zuckerman and Reis, 1977).

Studies have shown that

mock jurors are influenced by such extralegal factors as the
defendant's character (Landy and Aronson, 1969; Nemeth and
Sosis, 1973; Sigall and Landy, 1972),.attractiveness

(Efran,

1974; Kalven and Zeisal, 1966; Sigall and Ostrove, 1975) ,
social economic status and gender (Gleason and Harris, 1976),
the source of the defendant's character description (Dowdle,
Gillen and Miller, 1974), the sentence facing convicted
defendants (Kaplan and Simon, 1972; Kerr, 1978; McComas and
Noll, 1974; Vidmar,

1972) and pretrial publicity (Hoiberg and

1
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Stires, 1973).

Personal factors, such as jurors' level of

authoritarianism (Berg and Vidmar, 1975; Boehm, 1968; Bray
and Noble, 1978; Centers, Shomer and Rodrigues, 1970;
Mitchell and Byrne, 1972) , their attitudes towards the death
sentence (Jurow, 1971) and the nature of jurors' internalexternal locus of control

(Phares and Wilson, 1972) have also

been shown to influence legal outcomes.
While several social psychological theories have been
tested in studies using mock juries, a strong theoretical
understanding of the process by which individual jurors arrive
at a verdict preference has not emerged (Davis, Bray and Holt,
1976) .

Many of the theoretical models in jury research are

essentially social decision schemas for estimating the math
ematical probability of a jury's post deliberation group out
come from individual jurors' initial choices

(e.g., Davis,

Bray and Holt, 1976; Gelfand and Solomon, 1974; Kalven and
Zeisal, 1966).

The success of these schemas accentuates the

ecological importance of also understanding how individual
jurors arrive at their preferences prior to deliberation.
Reinforcement theory (e.g., Byrne, 1971; Byrne and
Clore, 1970; Landy and Aronson, 1969) offers one account of
how extralegal elements of the trial can influence a jury's
decision.

Factors such as the defendant's character or

attractiveness produce positive or negative affect in the
juror.

Through classical conditioning, this response becomes

attached to the defendant and leads to a shift in the direc
tion of the verdict.

3

Sigall and Ostrove (1975) have illustrated that while
the reinforcement model accounts for some juridic processes,
the relationship of affect to verdict can be a bit more com
plex.

They discovered that physical attractiveness, a factor

which normally induces positive affect, can actually be detri
mental to a defendant accused of swindle.

Attractiveness

facilitates commission of this crime because victims are more
likely to be swayed or charmed by an attractive swindler.

An

attractive defendant may be a more potentially successful
swindler and jurors therefore find him more likely to have com
mitted the crime.

Thus while affect appears to have a biasing

influence, factors which produce affect might also have some
cognitive value when considered in relation to the crime and
trial situation.
Some social psychological approaches focus on the role
of information processing on decision making.

Kaplan and

Kemmerick (1974), for example, have claimed that pieces of
evidential and nonevidential information of varying subjective
value are combined additively

(Fishbein, 1967) and the particu

lar value of each piece of information is determined through
some sort of attribution process
Kelley, 1973).

(e.g., Jones and Davis, 1972;

However, the authors do not specify the pro

cess and focus more on how information is combined rather than
on how it is weighted.

They tested their model by manipulating

positive, neutral or negative character information and high
or low incriminating evidence in a factorial design.
dicted, more favorable character information and lower

As pre
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incriminating evidence decreased assessments of guilt in an
additive fashion.

In the integrative approach of Ostrom,

Werner and Saks (1978) , verdicts are a weighted average
(Anderson, 1967) of jurors' initial attitudes toward the
defendant and subsequent trial material.

The more negative

the initial attitude toward the defendant and the stronger
the evidence of guilt, the more likely jurors were to convict
the defendant.
However, legal literature has suggested that there is
a side to juridic decision making that is not based merely
on consideration of evidence.

Quinney (1970), for example,

holds the Marxist view that the American system attempts to
keep the ruling class in power.

This approach to justice

suggests a variety of ways in which a trial can be influenced
by systematic bias in interpreting information.

Perhaps a way

to conceptualize this subjective side is to posit that ver
dicts are more than a function of several factors; they are
also a function of the weights which jurors decide to assign
factors.

The weighting process is made complex by the fact

that reactions to one piece of information may interact with
interpretations of other pieces.

For example, if personal

information about the defendant comes out in testimony, this
information may be combined with other units of evidence to
arrive at a verdict.

However, various evaluations of personal

information may lead jurors to form different guilt assess
ments and subsequently may lead to quite different interpre
tations of evidence linking the defendant to the crime.

5

Cognitive consistency processes may be one key to understand
ing how these evaluations occur.
Efran (1974), for example, examined one instance in
which jurors' evaluations of evidence were altered by extralegal factors.

Attractiveness of the defendant was varied

along with trial information.

While attractiveness did in

fluence verdicts in some conditions, it failed to do so when
evidence was strongly against the defendant.

In this case,

jurors reliably found him guilty irrespective of appearance.
The interesting result was that jurors with the more incrim
inating evidence felt the defendant was less attractive.
Efran proposed a cognitive dissonance explanation for the
findings; incriminating evidence produced a tendency toward
conviction and attractiveness toward acquittal.

To reduce

the discrepancy, jurors lowered their assessments of attrac
tiveness.

Vidmar

(1972) also found that following a verdict,

jurors' evaluations of evidence were congruent with the ver
dict rendered.
Juror decision making provides a context that has unique
characteristics in comparison to other types of information
processing.

For example, in policy making situations, the

outcome alternatives can often be modified before a final
decision is made.

In various types of elections, though a

forced choice is required, this choice has a number of mean
ings; for example, both candidates are good but one is better,
or both candidates are bad and one is the lesser of two evils.
In the courtroom however, a guilty verdict implies that

6

information indicating innocence was wrong.

A one sided

choice must emerge after two sided presentation of evidence
and therefore information can be subject to a variety of
interpretations.

Thus greater focus on the nature of sub

jective weighting processes may greatly enhance the theo
retical perspective offered by information integration
theorists.
A systematic model of courtroom decision making must
provide a framework to explain the general nature of juror
subjectivity.

To account more fully for the human factor

in the courtroom, psychologists must understand what leads
jurors to weigh certain information heavily and reject other
information.

Affect certainly plays a role in the verdict,

but when is affect important and how does it interact with
the processing of evidence?

Jurors may distort discrepant

trial information to arrive at a consistent interpretation
of this information, but what rule governs the means by
which consistency is achieved and the subsequent effect of
this outcome on verdict?
One concept holds promise for addressing these issues:
the statistical notion of hypothesis testing (Feinberg, 1971).
A variety of research has attempted to apply a Type I-Type II
error schema to legal psychology.

The Type I error has been

previously defined as convicting an innocent defendant (e.g.,
Kerr, 1978).

Reciprocally, a Type II error can be defined

as acquitting a guilty one.

As in the statistical model,

the two tendencies oppose each other; the more jurors attempt
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to avoid Type I errors, the more stringent they set their
alpha level and the more likely they are to make Type II
errors.

In other words, as jurors attempt to lower the prob

ability of sending innocent defendants to jail, they increase
the probability of letting the guilty go free and vice versa.
Research has focused on the Type I error.

The bulk

of experimental work has centered on the judge's "charge to
the jury" about the standard of proof in criminal cases
(i.e., his/her verbal instructions that the defendant is
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable shadow of
a doubt, Supreme Court Reporter, 1971).

Because this natur

ally occurring courtroom event controls the definition of
due process it is a clearcut manipulation of the alpha level
and Type I error (Frank, 1973; Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek,
Holt and Davis, 1976; Owen, 1973; Sealy and Cornish, 1973) .
The jury is provided with a criterion to judge at what point
there is enough evidence to convict.
Judicial instructions from several states provide a
variety of definitions of reasonable doubt.

These criteria

can range from "you must be sure and certain on the evidence
that the accused is guilty" to "you must feel satisfied that
it is more likely than not that the accused is guilty"
(Kerr et al., 1976).

The more stringent the criterion the

lower the conviction rate.
Despite the great variation in charges, experimental
manipulations of these instructions has not produced strong
effects.

In Frank (1973) and Sealy and Cornish's

(1973)
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work, instructions produced no effects.

Kerr et al.

(1976)

fourtd that judges' instructions did have effects but only for
extremely mixed evidence.

Furthermore, stringent instructions

resulted only in more hung juries, not in more acquittals.
Several possible reasons exist for the weakness of
these manipulations.

Kerr et al.

(1976) suggest, perhaps

"guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" is subject to a number of
interpretations each evoking its own criterion.

Perhaps as

Frank (1973) suggests, the instructions are confusing to
people.

Furthermore, jurors familiar with the reasonable

doubt concept may already have their own interpretation and
choose to ignore the judge's viewpoint.
Recently, Kerr (1978) has suggested a broader opera
tionalization of the Type I error.

Rather than the criterion

being set by the judge, in Kerr's work the possible conse
quences of the juror's decision became a determinant of his
or her criterion.
Kerr's work stems from the Vidmar (1972)

"Algiers

Motel" experiment and several subsequent studies (Hester
and Smith, 1973; Kaplan and Simon, 1972; McComas and Noll,
1974; Robertson, Rich and Ross, 1973).

In the "Algiers Motel"

study, the defendant was accused of robbing a motel office
and killing the proprietor in the act.

Pretest jurors rated

the severity of the crime as somewhere between manslaughter
and second degree murder.

Jurors in different conditions

read this crime and were required to find the defendant
guilty or not guilty of various charges.

When forced to
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choose between guilty of first degree murder or not guilty*
46% of the jurors found the man quilty.

When more reasonable

or a greater number of alternatives were available subjects
convicted the defendant more often.

About 92% of the jurors

convicted the man when four decision alternatives were avail
able.
Kerr, using the same stimuli as Vidmar, examined the
effects of charge seriousness and prescribed penalty.

Over

all, he found that when more serious penalties followed con
viction or when less choice of penalty existed, jurors ac
quitted the defendant more often and required more evidence
to convict.

He posited that as penalty increases, the con

sequences of a Type I error become more serious.

Consequently,

as the criterion for conviction rises, the chance of a false
positive decision (alpha) becomes lower and conviction be
comes unlikely.

Kerr drew upon Thomas and Hogue's (1976)

model to explain the relationship between conviction and guilt
with a hypothetical quantitative model.

When the amount of

convicting evidence is greater than the criterion for con
viction, the conviction will result; when the amount of evi
dence is less, acquittal will result.
The present research attempts to extend the work of
Kerr et al.

(1976) and Kerr (1978) to devise a theoretical

framework which will tie together various aspects of juridic
decision making.

Jurors' final verdicts may be strongly

affected by the criterion of guilt (alpha level) they estab
lish due to the consequences of each error.

However,

decisions may also be a function of the pieces of information
they decide to accept and the weight they give to each par
ticular piece.

Perhaps the consequences of the Type I and

Type II error mediate these processes as well.

The stronger

the consequences of the Type I error relative to the Type II
error, the more jurors become concerned with due process
(Kaplan, 1975; Packer, 1968) and the more likely they are
to interpret information in a manner favorable to the defen
dant.

This concern with due process will be called a Type I

error orientation.

The stronger the consequences of the

Type II error relative to the Type I error, the more con
cerned they become with crime control (Kaplan, 1975; Packer,
1968) and the more likely they are to interpret information
in a way unfavorable to the defendant.

This concern with

crime control will be called a Type II error orientation.
Thus, the strength of the Type I and Type II error is not
only posited to influence alpha levels but also to provide
jurors with an orientation toward processing trial informa
tion.
This Type I-Type II error orientation can serve as an
organizing principle which incorporates findings from pre
vious research.

For example, the impact of affect laden

extralegal factors such as physical attractiveness has been
shown to sway jurors' decisions.
occur?

However, how does this

A juror cannot in good conscience acknowledge physi

cal attractiveness as a piece of evidence.

More likely,

affective factors change jurors' Type I-Type II error

orientation; it becomes a more serious error to wrongly con
vict an attractive defendant because of the positive feelings
he/she evokes or because attractive people are perceived as
"good"

(Dion, Bersheid and Walster, 1972).

Subsequently,

the juror may weigh evidence more in the attractive suspect's
favor and be more likely to acquit him/her.

If on the other

hand, the crime is one such as swindle where attractiveness
facilitates success, then it becomes a more dangerous error
to let a potentially more successful criminal free.

There

fore, evidence is weighed more strongly against the defendant
(as occurred in Sigall and Ostrove, 1975).
Similarly, when jurors process discrepant information,
they may distort some of it in order to arrive at consistent
conclusions.

The hypothesis testing model provides a frame

work to account for how this may occur; various factors in
the case such as crime severity and liking for the defendant
produce Type I (due process) or Type II (crime control) orien
tations in the juror.

When discrepant pieces of information

must be considered, those consistent with the juror's Type IType II error orientation will be weighted heavily, while
those that are inconsistent will be discounted (e.g., Kelley,
1972).

Thus, when a crime is so severe that the potential

Type II error is high, or when evidence is so strong that a
Type I error is unlikely, the juror will probably ignore af
fectively positive extralegal factors such as the defendant's
physical attractiveness

(e.g., Efran, 1974).
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This research tests a modified hypothesis testing
model (Type I-Type II error orientation model) by manipu
lating the nature of the crime presented to mock jurors.
In one condition, the perpetrator steals a car, while in the
other condition he steals the car and runs over a mother and
her daughter in the act, killing the mother and paralyzing
the little girl.

While the latter set of crimes deserves

a harsher sentence, objectively the verdict should be unaf
fected by crime severity.

Evidence linking the defendant

to the acts in each condition is highly similar and unlike
previous research, the characteristics of the man on trial
are identical.
However, because the auto theft-hit and run crime has
stronger negative consequences, jurors are expected to find
the defendant guilty more often.

The Type II error of let

ting a guilty defendant free is more serious because the
perpetrator is a potentially more dangerous criminal and be
cause he is more deserving of punishment in this condition.
Thus, evidence is likely to be interpreted in a manner un
favorable to the defendant and reactions toward the defendant
are likely to be more negative.
Results on dependent measures are expected to be con
sistent with this model.

On the three measures of verdict

(guilt or innocence, degree of guilt and likelihood of guilt)
jurors are expected to be more guilt oriented in the severe
crime condition.

On the five items assessing emotional reac

tions toward the suspect, ratings should be more negative
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with the serious crime.

Furthermore, the negative emotional

reaction toward the suspect is predicted to be more highly
correlated with guilt in this condition, indicating that
those swayed toward guilt also form negative reactions to
wards the defendant consistent with their verdict.

Two

scales indirectly assess the strength of jurors' Type II
error orientation.

These dimensions are expected to be

highly correlated with the reactions toward the suspect
and with verdict.
Negative emotional reaction is expected to mediate
the relationship between Type II error and verdict.

That is,

with the more serious crime the potential consequences of a
Type II error are higher and subjects are likely to distort
information in a way unfavorable to the defendant.

One in

dicator of this process is the emotional reactions they form
toward the defendant.

Stronger guilt ratings may not be a

direct outcome of the seriousness of the crime but rather a
function of jurors' evaluations of the defendant irrationally
altered by crime outcome.

Thus crime severity, an extralegal

factor in verdict formation, is expected to indirectly affect
verdict.
A more direct measure of information distortion would
be to actually assess how jurors process evidence.

Evidence

processing was operationalized by having jurors write onehalf page open-ended reports about why they reached the ver
dicts they did.

These reports should show that jurors facing

a stronger Type II error will process information in a manner

14

more unfavorable to the defendant.

In sum, guilt oriented

ratings may be a function of stronger reactions against the
defendant and more unfavorable evidence interpretation be
cause of the stronger negative emotional reaction produced
by the crime.

Findings consistent with this analysis cannot

definitively prove that the causal relationship between Type
II errors, information processing and guilt exists.

However,

results can show the existence of a relationship between
crime severity and verdict and, therefore, can demonstrate
that the present model is a plausible account worthy of fur
ther investigation.
The expected results are opposite to the findings of
previous research.
charges cause

Kerr (1978) claimed that more serious

more serious consequences for Type I errors

because the defendant faces a more severe penalty.
jurors should acquit the defendant more often.

The

In the present

research, the defendant also would face a more severe penalty
if convicted of a more serious crime.

However, the negative

elements of the crime are expected to be more salient than
the sentence facing the defendant because sentencing is never
mentioned or dealt with as an issue.

While some jurors may

be swayed by the harsher sentence facing the defendant with
the serious crime, more are expected to be swayed toward con
viction by their reactions to the negative nature of the
crime.

II. METHOD
Jurors
Seventy-two male and seventy-two female jurors parti
cipated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a require
ment for their introductory psychology course.

Nine parti

cipants of each gender were assigned to every cell in the
design.
Design
The study originally employed a 2x2x2x2 between sub
jects design.

The two levels of crime severity tested the

hypothesis of the experiment.

These were crossed with three

other factors: an eyewitness testimony factor which manipulated
whether or not the key eyewitness could pick the defendant
out of a police lineup, a location factor which manipulated
whether or not the defendant resided near the scene of the
crime and a sex of subject factor.
Stimulus Material
Jurors received booklets containing all the trial
information (see Appendix 1).

Following a cover page which

introduced the study, booklets began with a one-page descrip
tion of the crime, including details about the location of
the incident, the perpetrator's actions and the apprehension
and booking of the suspect.

The perpetrator, noticing keys
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left in the ignition of a car, runs to the car, starts the
engine and drives away.

A couple of hours later, police

apprehend a suspect four blocks from the location of the
stolen vehicle.
The nature of the crime is manipulated on the first
page.

In half of the cases, the perpetrator while driving

away in the stolen car, swerves towards and strikes a mother
and her daughter.
paralyzed.

The mother is killed and the daughter

Remaining jurors received a description of just

the auto theft.
The next four pages of the booklet contained case
transcripts edited for authenticity by a district court
judge.1

In these transcripts, two witnesses gave testimony;

a woman who saw the crime and gave a description of the per
petrator and the police officer who arrested the defendant
based on the woman's description.

Booklets explained that no

other evidence was available.
Transcripts were constructed so that evidence did not
link the suspect more closely to the crime in one case than
the other.
conditions.

The policeman's testimony was identical across
The eyewitness to the crime had to describe

somewhat different events in each condition.

However, the

location of the crime, her location at the incident, the cer
tainty of her testimony and the accuracy, length and detail
1The author would like to thank Judge Constantino of
the District Court of Clinton, Massachusetts for his time
and effort in reviewing and editing experimental stimuli.
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of her account were kept constant across conditions.

In the

more serious case, she described the defendant stealing the
car, glancing at the victims, swerving toward them and strik
ing them.

In the less serious case she described the defen

dant stealing
away from
In
lated.

the car,glancing at a red light, swerving

the curb and driving through the light.
the transcripts, two sets of evidence were manipu

The strength of the eyewitness' testimony was varied.

For half of the cases, she was capable of identifying the
defendant in a police lineup (incriminating evidence condi
tion) , while for the other half she picked the wrong man from
the lineup (nonincriminating evidence condition).
tor was brought up during cross examination.

This fac

The prosecuting

attorney mentioned her success in identifying the defendant
in the incriminating evidence condition, while the defense
attorney noted her failure in the nonincriminating evidence
condition.

The length of this segment was equal across cells.

A second factor was the residence of the defendant.

In one

condition, the defendant resided near the scene of the crime,
making him more likely to have committed the crime.

In the

other condition, he resided near where the police apprehended
him, making him more likely to be a victim of mistaken iden
tity.
These evidence factors may provide a validity check
for the crime severity effect.

While evidence is kept as

constant as possible across crime severity conditions, slight
differences are still possible due to the different nature
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of each crime.

However, if the crime severity effect is as

strong or stronger than the eyewitness identification or
location variables, then it would be unlikely for this effect
to be an artifact of different evidence in each condition.
Jurors should be less sensitive to subtle evidence effects
across crime conditions than they are to a factor such as
the key eyewitness1 ability to identify the suspect in a
police lineup.
Dependent Measures
Attached to the booklets were a set of seventeen depen
dent measures.

All measures were eleven point scales with

the exception of three forced choice items.

Each of the

eleven point scales were labelled at endpoints

(see Appendix

2).

Manipulation checks.

The auto theft-hit and run crime

was posited to be more serious than the auto theft alone
crime.

To check this assumption, an updated modification

of the Sellin-Wolfgang scale (Roth, 1978) was used.

This

scale ranged from 1 to approximately 110, 1 representing an
extremely mild crime and 110 an extremely severe one.
to various numbers were crime labels

Next

(e.g., "$1000 theft,"

"$10,000 armed robbery," "rape," etc.) which aided jurors in
interpreting numerical values on- the scale.
The eyewitness testimony factor varied whether or not
the key eyewitness could select the defendant from a police
lineup.

The success of this manipulation was assessed through
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the accuracy of jurors' recall as to whether or not her
identification was correct.

Jurors were also asked whether

or not they believed her testimony and if her testimony had
an effect on their verdict.
To check on the location factor, jurors were asked
both where the crime was committed and where the defendant
resided.

Accuracy of recall was again assessed.

Jurors were

also asked to judge the effect which the crime's location had
on their verdict.
Verdict.

Verdict was assessed through a forced choice

"innocent" or "guilty" item.

Scales also assessed degree of

guilt and likelihood of guilt.

These two items were separated

by eight scales so that jurors' responses on one dimension
would be as distinct as possible from their responses on the
other.

The likelihood of guilt item asked "how likely do you

think it was that the defendant committed the crime?"

While

verdict could be a function of more than one factor, this
measure was of particular interest because it assessed jurors'
judgments of a single dimension (i.e., whether or not the
defendant was the perpetrator).
Emotional reactions toward the defendant.

The jurors'

emotional reactions toward the defendant were assessed with
self ratings of anger, sympathy, threat, suspicion and dislike.
These reactions were expected to be low in general but more
negative in the severe crime condition.

The defendant did not

take the stand and almost no personal information of affective
value existed.

Thus, little reason existed to form an
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impression of him.

However, these measures could serve as

assessors of one form of information distortion (i.e., how
jurors changed evaluations of their emotional reactions
toward the defendant).
Reactions to the crime.

An indirect measure of the

Type II error orientation can be obtained by assessing how
negatively jurors reacted to the crime.

This dimension was

assessed with scales asking "how important is it for the per
petrator of this crime to be caught and prosecuted?" and
"how angry does a crime of this nature make you?"
Jurors' self-report dat a .

Upon completion of the

scales, jurors were required to write a one-half page state
ment describing why they found the defendant innocent or
guilty.

No time limit was imposed for this task.

These

statements were expected to show a different pattern of re
sults across crime severity conditions.
Procedure
Ten to twenty jurors were run at a time.

Booklets were

randomly distributed and as many cells as possible were repre
sented in each session.
Upon entering the laboratory, jurors were handed an
experimental booklet.

They were instructed that the experi

ment involved role playing mock jurors and that they would be
presented with an abbreviated version of a courtroom case.
After reading the case contained in the booklet, they were
instructed to fill out the attached scales as if they were
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real jurors passing judgment.

Jurors sat at least a seat

apart from each other, but in case another's responses were
visible, they were informed that each juror would be respond
ing to a different case.

Finally, they were instructed not

to turn back to the case once they began filling out scales.
This instruction was given so that manipulation checks re
quiring memory of material would be valid.

III. RESULTS
General Description
Dependent measures were analyzed in five distinct
groupings: manipulation checks, verdict measures, emotional
reactions toward the defendant measures, reactions to the
crime (Type II error orientation) measures and juror self
report measures.

Because manipulation checks tested the

validity of the crime severity, eyewitness testimony and
location factors, they

are reported first.

Next, significant

multivariate and univariate analyses of variance findings are
reported separately for the verdict, reactions to the defen
dant and reactions to the crime variables.

These analyses

were carried out to assess how the various manipulations
affected jurors' reactions to the trial.
Note that the suspicion dimension was initially concep
tualized as a measure of emotional reaction.

However, results

indicated that it correlated equally with verdict and emotion
measures.

Therefore, this scale is incorporated in MANOVAS

for both sets of variables.
ported for all F tests.

Also, only main effects are re

Interactive effects did not show

multivariate significance and the number of second, third and
fourth order univariate interactions significant at the .05
level was less than expected by chance.

With nine variables

on each of eleven interactive effects, ninety-nine significance
tests were performed.

Of these, five can be expected to be
22
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significant by chance alone.
effect was significant.

However, only one interactive

This effect did not interact with

any of the main effects reported.
Finally chi square analyses of variance performed on
response frequency for juror self report data are reported.
Comparisons were made between the two crime severity condi
tions to test if jurors were distorting trial information in
arriving at a verdict.

Responses were also examined as descrip

tive measures to explore the variation in information inter
pretation especially between those jurors convicting the defen
dant and those acquitting him.
In general, while analyses of variance showed a pattern
of differences across conditions they could not show how
measures of verdict, emotional reactions toward the defendant
and reactions to the crime (Type II error orientation) mea
sures influenced each other.

The hypothesis of the experiment

was that reactions to the crime would affect processing of
trial information and emotional reactions toward the defendant.
These "mediating variables" would then affect verdict.

To

assess the relationships among variables, ancillary analyses
were performed.
First, three sets of correlations were examined; one
for all data and one for each of the two crime severity con
ditions.

Separate correlation patterns for each condition

were of particular interest because it was expected that emo
tional reactions would have much higher relationships to ver
dict with a severe crime than they would with a less severe
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one.

This would be one indication that emotional reactions

were mediating the relationship between crime severity and
verdict.
Next as an exploratory test of the present model, path
analyses were performed on verdict, emotional reactions to
ward the defendant and reactions to the crime (Type II error
orientation) dimensions.

Scales were combined so that one

score represented each dimension.

Clustering was based on

correlation matrices and a varimax rotated factor analysis
performed on all measures except manipulation checks.

Finally,

regression paths were examined separately for jurors render
ing innocent verdicts and those rendering guilty verdicts in
the severe crime condition.

Convicting jurors should be most

influenced by these processes.
Manipulation Checks
As expected, the auto theft-hit and run crime was rated
as significantly more severe (x = 65.11 for the auto thefthit and run case and x = 17.32 for the auto theft alone condi
tion, F (1/128) = 307.63, p < .01).

Every juror in the auto

theft-hit and run condition reported the case as more severe
than every juror in the auto theft alone condition.

For the

testimony effect, 134 out of 144 jurors knew whether or not
the eyewitness could pick the defendant out of a police lineup.
The remaining ten appeared to be distributed randomly through
out conditions and did not present a serious threat to validity.
However, jurors on the whole did not report being more
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influenced by the eyewitness1 testimony or believing her more
when she could identify the suspect.

In general then, jurors

were aware of this information but did not report being af
fected by it.
The location manipulation failed to function effectively.
Of the 144 subjects only 49 could properly identify both
where the car was stolen and where the defendant resided.
Jurors did not report being influenced by the defendant's
residence (F < 1) and analyses with this factor yielded no
significant effects.

In describing remaining tests, ratings

are collapsed across the location factor.
Verdict Measures
Significant verdict main effects occurred on both the
crime severity and eyewitness testimony factors.

The primary

prediction of the experiment was that jurors in the auto
theft-hit and run condition would be more guilt oriented than
those in the auto theft alone condition.

Significant differ

ences in the predicted direction occurred on all measures of
verdict (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).
Since the innocent-guilty dimension was a dichotomous one,
it was not analyzed in the MANOVA used for remaining verdict
items.

About 29% of the jurors receiving the more serious

crime found the defendant guilty versus only 12.5% of those
2
getting the less serious one (X (1) = 5.1, p < .03).

A multi

variate analysis of variance was performed on guilt measures.
The multivariate F was significant (£ < .02) and univariate

TABLE 1
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Verdict Measures as a Function
of Crime Severity, Juror Gender and Nature of Testimony
Verdict Measures
Crime
Severity

Gender

S
E

Male

V
E
R

Female

E

M

Male

I
L
D

Female

Testimony

Likelihood
of Guilt

Degree of
Guilt

Suspicion

X

SD

X

SD

X

SD

Incriminating
evidence

4.28

2.47

4.56

2.57

43.89

22.00

Nonincriminating
evidence

4.06

2.21

3.39

2.28

35.00

20.01

Incriminating
evidence

4.89

2.76

4.28

3.10

53.89

27.68

Nonincriminating
evidence

4.33

2.64

4.67

2.85

45.00

23.58

Incriminating
evidence

3.56

1.98

3.61

2.40

37.22

17.42

Nonincriminating
evidence

2.56

2.06

2.33

2.14

27.22

17.08

Incriminating
evidence

4.00

2.14

4.06

1.80

44.44

19.17

3.50

1.96

2.06

1.63

37.22

17.76

Nonincriminating
evidence

Note.
The "degree of guilt" scale was originally a -5 to +5 scale.
However every
score was raised 5 points to make ratings range from 0 to 10. Thus "degree of guilt" and
"suspicion" are 0 to 10 dimensions while "likelihood of guilt" ranges from 0 to 100.

main effects for degree of guilt (p < .02), suspicion (g> <
.01) and likelihood of guilt (p < .03) were significant (see
Table 2).
The testimony factor manipulated the ability of the
eyewitness to pick the defendant out of a police lineup.

This

should be an important piece of information because one would
expect that her failure to identify the defendant leaves very
little evidence against him.

However, the overall effects of

this variable on trial outcome were slightly weaker

(as shown

by the canonical R) than the effects of crime severity.
Jurors receiving the more incriminating evidence did find the
defendant more suspicious

(p < .02) and more likely to have

committed the crime (p < .02).

The magnitude of these effects

was about equal to the crime severity factor.

However, un

like the crime severity factor, jurors did not reach a signif
icantly greater number of guilty verdicts

(25% found the

defendant guilty in the incriminating evidence condition and
16.7% found him guilty in the nonincriminating evidence con
dition) .
(p < .15).

They also failed to find the defendant more guilty
Multivariate effects for the testimony factor were

significant (p < .05).

(See Tables 1 and 2 for these compari

sons .)
Emotional Reactions Toward the Defendant
The crime severity factor was the only one producing
significant effects on emotional reactions measures
Table 3 for means and standard deviations).

(see

Jurors' reactions
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TABLE 2
Multivariate and Univariate Tests for Significance
for Crime Severity and Eyewitness Testimony
Effects on Verdict Measures
Crime Severity Main Effect
Multivariate Effect
F value
3.79

Degrees
of Freedom
3/134

P value

Canonical R

.012

.28

Univariate Effects
Measure

Mean
Square

Degrees
of Freedom

F value

P value

Degree
of Guilt

35.01

1/136

6.65

.011

Suspicion

52.56

1/136

9.23

.003

2256.25

1/136

5.18

.024

Likelihood
of Guilt

Eyewitness Testimony Main Effect
Multivariate Effect
F value
2.81

Degrees
of Freedom
3/134

P value

Canonical R

.042

.24

Univariate Effects
Measure

Mean
Square

Degrees
of Freedom

F value

P value

Degree
of Guilt

11.67

1/136

2.22

.140

Suspicion

37.01

1/136

6.50

.012

2756.25

1/136

6.32

.013

Likelihood
of Guilt

TABLE 3
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Emotional Reactions
Toward the Defendant Measures as a Function of Crime
Severity, Juror Gender and Nature of Testimony
Verdict Measures
Sympathy

Anger
Severity

Gender

Testimony

S
E

X

SD

Threat
X

SD

Suspicion

Dislike

X

X

SD

SD

SD

X

3.67

2.93

5.0

2.77

2.44 2.2

4.56

2.57

2.33

2.43

2.44

2.57

5.72

2.59

1.78 2.18

3.39

2.23

1.78

2.58

Male

N

V
E
R
E

M

2.00

2.87

3.78

3.60

1.67

2.14

4.28

3.10

1.11

2.45

3.44

3.22

4.61

3.09

2.33

2.50

4.67

2.85

2.78

2.80

Female

I

,83

1.58

4.61

2.64

.83

1.47

3.61

2.40

1.00

1.78

N

,28

.58

3.50

2.12

.39

.61

2.33

2.14

.22

.55

I

1.06

1.43

3.89

2.76

1.50

1.43

4.06

1.80

1.28

2.08

N

.89

1.23

5.33

2.81

.83

1.30

2.06

1.63

1.00

1.46

Male

I
L
D

Female

^The letter I stands for the incriminating testimony condition or the success of
the eyewitness to identify the defendant in a police lineup.
2
The letter N stands for the nonincriminating testimony condition or the failure
of the eyewitness to identify the defendant in a police lineup.
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toward the criminal were significantly more negative in the
auto theft-hit and run condition than they were in the auto
theft alone condition despite the fact that guilt had not
been established.

The multivariate finding was significant

(p < .01) and jurors as expected reported their feelings of
anger (p < .01),. dislike (p < .01), threat (p < .01), and
suspicion (p < .01) as significantly stronger in the serious
crime condition (see Table 4 for significance tests).

These

results indicate that the nature of the crime produced a
cluster of differences most of which by lav; or rational thought
should not have been part of decision making.
Reactions to the Crime
The reactions to the crime measures were constructed
to operationalize the Type II error orientation concept.
Again, significant effects appeared only on the crime severity
factor (see Table 5 for means and standard deviations).
multivariate analysis of variance
tests on "anger at the crime"

The

(p < .01) and univariate

(p < .01) and importance of

having the perpetrator caught (p < .01) were all significant
(see Table 6 for significance tests).
Juror Self-report Data
The purpose of the juror self-report items was to assess
the ways in which jurors processed trial information.

"Rea

sons for verdict" responses were tabulated and frequency com
parisons were made both between crime severity conditions and
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TABLE 4
Multivariate and Univariate Tests of Significance
for Crime Severity Effects on Emotional
Reactions Toward the Defendant Measures

Multivariate Effect
F Value

Degrees of Freedom

12.18

5/132

P less than

Canonical R

.001

.464

Univariate Effects

Measure

Mean
Square

Anger

162.56

Degrees
of Freedom

F Value

P less than

1/136

32.34

.001

7.11

1/136

.90

.350

Threat

49.00

1/136

14.77

.001

Suspicion

52.56

1/136

9.23

.003

Dislike

45.56

1/136

10.47

.002

Sympathy

TABLE 5
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Reactions to the Crime
Measures (Type II errors) as a Function of Crime
Severity, Juror Gender and Nature of Testimony
Verdict Measures

Crime
Severity

Importance of Having
the Criminal Caught
Gender

S
E

Male

V
E
R

Female

E

M

Male

I

Testimony

X

SD

crime
Anger at the Crime
X

SD

Incriminating
evidence

9.33

1.24

9.11

1.02

Nonincriminating
evidence

9.50

,92

9.11

1.45

Incriminating
evidence

9.06

1.63

8.56

2.18

Nonincriminating
evidence

9.61

.92

8.83

1.20

Incriminating
evidence

6.67

2.25

5.61

1.85

Nonincriminating
evidence

6.89

2.47

5.67

2.47

Incriminating
evidence

7.67

2.61

6.89

2.56

6.56

2.79

5.33

2.95

L
D
Female

Nonincriminating
evidence
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TABLE 6
Multivariate and Univariate Tests of Significance
for Crime Severity Effects on Reactions
to the Crime Measures

Multivariate Effect
F Value

Degrees of Freedom

40.71

2/135

P less than

Canonical R

.001

.613

Univariate Effects

Measures
Importance of
Having the
Criminal
Caught
Anger at
the Crime

Mean
Square

Degrees
of Freedom

F Value

P less than

212.67

2/135

53.77

.001

330.03

2/135

77.31

.001
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between jurors finding the defendant innocent and those find
ing him guilty.
Due to the nonparametric nature of the data and the
variety of reasons given by jurors for their verdict, most
differences between crime severity conditions were not signif
icant with a chi. analysis of variance.
moderate effects seemed to occur.

Rather a pattern of

For example, more jurors

receiving the milder crime paid attention to the defendant's
race, making some sort of statement about race being held
against him such as "he was railroaded because he was Black."
In the severe crime condition 13.7% of the jurors recognized
this fact, while in the mild crime condition 22.3% paid atten
tion to it.

More jurors in the severe crime condition on the

other hand, paid attention to the fact that the defendant
could not account for his whereabouts

(25% in the severe crime

condition versus 11 % in the auto theft alone condition).
A Type I error orientation was defined in the self
reports by some form of the statements "reasonable doubt,"
"innocent until proven guilty" or "keep an innocent defendant
out of jail."

Concern for Type I errors should have resulted

in more acquittals.

However, results indicated that jurors

receiving the auto theft-hit and run crimes were more often
concerned with Type I errors despite the fact that jurors in
this condition overall found the defendant more guilty.

Sixty-

three percent of those acquitting the suspect in the severe
crime condition and only 41.3% in the mild condition expressed
the desire to avoid Type I errors.

Apparently, the auto theft-
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hit and run crime was linked with a longer jail sentence and
aroused concern for the defendant, as some jurors indicated.
Further analysis of self report data revealed inter
esting differences in reported processing of trial informa
tion between convicting and acquitting jurors.

The same units

of information were used by some jurors to find the defendant
innocent and by others to find him guilty.

For example, the

police apprehended the suspect four blocks from the crime.
Fifty-seven percent of those jurors convicting the defendant
felt that this proved guilt while 26.3% of those acquitting
the defendant felt that this proved innocence.
occurred with a variety of evidence.

Similar results

The eyewitness, for

example, was perceived as trustworthy and reliable by those
jurors convicting the defendant and as dishonest and unreliable
by those jurors acquitting him.

The arresting officer was

perceived to be correctly doing his job by jurors convicting
the defendant.

In fact, 48% of these jurors cited the officer's

identification and arrest of the defendant as one reason for
their verdict.

Meanwhile, no juror acquitting the defendant

mentioned this fact and 24% of the acquitting jurors actually
claimed that the officer was "biased," "racist" or "perse
cuting the defendant."
Ancillary Analyses
Correlations between variables.

Because of the different

patterns of correlations between crime severity conditions,
separate matrices are reported for each condition (see Table 7).

TABLE 7
Within Cell Correlations Between Variables Comparing
Severe and Mild Crime Conditions
Severe Crime Condition Correlations
Variables
.45

-.51

.48

.52

.37

22

.06

.77

06

1.00

-.26

.68

.66

.79

.07

.23

.63

-.35

21

1.00

-.21

-.47

-.22

-.07

17

-.53

.12

.73

.18

1.00

.57

.71

.12

,11

.55

.24

.40

-.03

.41

1.00

57

.16

09

.65

-.03

.52

24

.53

.45

1.00

.09

22

.54

Crime

j Anger at the
Crime

-.10

.05

.05

.03

.23

,08

1.00

.72

.03

g Importance
of Catching

-.03

-.01

.04

01

.23

.05

.40

1.00

.24

,72

.19

-.31

.18

.41

.17

.21

.12

1.00

Condition

Correlations

1.00

Mild

, Degree of
Guilt

7

2 Anger at

Defendant
2 Sympathy for

Defendant
4 Threat of

Defendant
2 Suspicion of

Defendant
6 Dislike of

Defendant

q Likelihood
of Guilt
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These separate patterns best illustrate the relationship of
emotional reactions toward the defendant measures to verdict
measures.

In general, an interesting and intuitively logical

pattern emerged.

Emotional reactions toward the defendant

had a much stronger relationship with guilt for the auto
theft-hit and run crime than it did for the auto theft alone
crime.

With the auto theft-hit and run crime, likelihood of

guilt had a r of .56 with emotional reactions toward the
defendant (p < .01) and degree of guilt had an r of .45 with
these measures

(£ < .01).

With the auto theft alone crime,

likelihood of guilt showed an r of .21 with the emotional
reactions measures

(n.s.) and degree of guilt showed an r

of .15 (n.s.).
As Table 7 indicates, the correlations between "reac
tions to the crime" measures and verdict were low for both
crime severity conditions.

This lack of strong correlation

was not expected here.
Exploratory model analysis.

The present hypotheses

claim that the relationship between Type II error and verdict
is mediated by distortion of both evidence and assessments
of the defendant.

To test the potential validity of this

model, path analyses were performed using partial beta weights
from multiple regression analyses.

Two separate analyses

were performed; one on total data and one on the severe crime
condition.
Prior to the analyses, composite scales were formed
for three dimensions.

The "Type II error orientation"

38

dimension was operationalized with "anger at the crime" and
"importance of having the criminal caught" scales.

Informa

tion distortion was operationalized with scales of threat,
anger and dislike toward the defendant.

This composite was

called the emotional reactions dimension.

Because interpre

tations of factual evidence were only assessed with open
ended reports, no metric existed to operationalize this dimen
sion.

Finally, the verdict dimension consisted of degree of

guilt and likelihood of guilt items.
Raw scores representing each dimension were added to
gether to form Type II error orientation, emotional mediator
and verdict components for a path analysis.

Justification

for clustering was based on a priori conceptualizations, cor
relation matrices and loadings on varimax rotated factor
analyses.

(See Table 8 for factor analyses.)

For example,

"suspicion of the defendant" was not clustered with any com
ponent because it correlated and loaded ambiguously with both
emotional reactions and verdict.

"Sympathy for the defendant"

was not used because its correlations with other emotion
items and its loading with these items, on factor analyses
were low.

Overall, factor analyses done for all (n = 144)

and severe condition jurors(n = 72) yielded three distinct
factors.

These factors fairly strongly matched the a priori

conceptualizations of Type II error orientation, emotional
reactions and verdict dimensions.
Figure 1 illustrates the causal pathway between Type
II error orientation, emotional reaction and verdict components
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TABLE 8
Varimax Rotated Factor Loadings for All Data,
Severe Crime Condition Data, and
Mild Crime Condition Data
Analysis of All Data
Variables

Factors
1

2

3

Degree of Guilt

.27

.76

.08

Anger at Defendant

.85

.17

.19

Sympathy for Defendant

.02

-.56

.09

Threat of Defendant

.79

.19

.12

Suspicion of Defendant

.57

.42

.21

Dislike for Defendant

.85

.07

.10

Importance of Catching
Criminal

.12

.08

.86

Anger at the Crime

.21

-.04

.86

Likelihood of Guilt

.39

.82

.15

Analysis of Severe Crime Data
Variables

Factors
1

2

3

Degree of Guilt

.26

.77

.15

Anger at Defendant

.86

.24

.12

-.10

-.69

.13

Threat of Defendant

.73

.28

.08

Suspicion of Defendant

.57

.52

.08

Dislike for Defendant

.87

.14

.12

Importance of Catching
Criminal

.08

.16

.57

Anger at the Crime

.19

-.17

.75

Likelihood of Guilt

.40

.81

.09

Sympathy for Defendant
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TABLE 8-— Continued

Analysis of Mild Crime Data
Variables

Factors
1

2

3

Degree of Guilt

.26

.77

.15

Anger at Defendant

.86

.24

.12

-.10

-.69

.13

Threat of Defendant

.73

.28

.08

Suspicion of Defendant

.57

.52

.08

Dislike for Defendant

.87

.14

.12

Importance of Catching
Criminal

.03

.16

.57

Anger at the Crime

.19

-.17

.75

Likelihood of Guilt

.40

.81

.09

Sympathy for Defendant
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FIGURE 1
Tests of Regression Paths for All Data,
Severe Crime Condition Data, and
Mild Crime Condition Data
Analysis of All Data
Regression Path
Type II Error
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^ 30__ Emotional Reactions
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Table of Direct and Indirect Relationships
Relationship

Direct
Correlation

Indirect
Correlation

Total
Correlation

Type II Error
Orientation—
Emotional Reaction

.30

Type II Error
Orientation—
Verdict

.06

.14

.20

Emotional Reaction
— Verdict

.46

.01

.47

.30
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FIGURE 1— Continued

Analysis of Severe Crime Data
Regression Path
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Analysis of Mild Crime Data
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Direct
Correlation
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suggested by the present hypothesis.

Though the correlation

between Type II error orientation and verdict is low, the
suggested model is strongly supported by the data.

That is,

across all data, the mediating effects of emotional reaction
accounted for twice as much of the correlation and four
times as much variability as the direct effect of Type II
error orientation alone on verdict did.

With the severe con

dition data, almost all variability shared between Type II
error orientation and verdict could be accounted for by the
mediating effects of emotional measures.
Because of the weak correlation between Type II error
orientation measures and verdict in the mild crime condition
(r = .08) further analyses of this data were unwarranted
(see Figure 1).

In general, two explanations could be given

for the unexpectedly low correlations between these dimensions
in both crime severity conditions.

Perhaps because the rela

tionship between Type II error orientation and verdict is al
most completely a function of the mediation of other factors,
a high r may be an unlikely occurrence.

Secondly, for crime

severity to show a strong relationship to verdict, perhaps
this relationship must be examined across a number of crimes.
The use of only two crimes may provide too restricted a range
of variability.
Finally, separate analyses of regression paths were
performed on acquitting and convicting jurors in the severe
crime condition.

In general, the major difference between

these two groups was in the relationship between Type II
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error orientation and emotional reactions toward the defen
dant (see Figure 2).

A moderate relationship (r = .48,

p < .05) existed between these dimensions with convicting
jurors

(n = 21 ) while no relationship (r = .0 0 ) existed be

tween these dimensions with acquitting jurors

(n = 52).

Also, convicting jurors reported significantly higher nega
tive emotional reactions than acquitting jurors (x = 12.6
for convicting jurors; x = 5.2 for acquitting jurors, p <
.01).

These findings lent strength to the hypothesis that

emotional reactions toward the defendant served as some sort
of mediating factor between Type II error orientation and
verdict.

That is, those jurors who found the defendant

guilty perhaps did so as a result of a stronger negative
emotional reaction toward the defendant stemming from their
reactions to the crime (Type II error orientation).

Again,

a stronger relationship between Type II error orientation
and verdict is needed before firm conclusions can be drawn.

FIGURE 2
Tests of Regression Paths for Acquitting and Convicting
Jurors in the Severe Crime Condition

Analysis of Acquitting Jurors
Regression Path
Type II Error i 00_3> Emotional Reactions
43
^.verd’ct
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Table of Direct and Indirect Relationships
Relationship

Direct
Correlation

Indirect
Correlation

Total
Correlation

Type II Error
Orientation—
Emotional Reaction

.00

Type II Error
Orientation—
Verdict

.03

.01

.04

Emotional Reaction
— Verdict

.43

.00

.43

.00
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FIGURE 2— Continued

Analysis of Convicting Jurors
Regression Path
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Orientation

_.4 8_ ^ Emotional Reactions
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Table of Direct and Indirect Relationships
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Type II Error
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Emotional Reaction
Type II Error
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Emotional Reaction
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Direct
Correlation

Indirect
Correlation

Total
Correlation

.48

.48

-.01

.18

.19

.40

.00
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IV. DISCUSSION
As in much mock juror research, the issue of external
validity must be considered before drawing conclusions from
the data.

Subjects were not representative of a typical

jury pool; they did not deliberate as a jury does, they knew
that the trial was fictitious and they received written
rather than live presentation.

Until more is known about

how experimental legal settings simulate actual courtroom
situations, findings in studies of this nature must be con
sidered suggestive rather than definitive (Kerr et al., 1976).
However, several points need to be made.

Almost all

jurors at the end of the experimental session reported being
involved in the legal task.

While an actual courtroom situa

tion may produce different results, it seems likely that the
emotional nature of a real trial might enhance the effects
of this study.

Furthermore, one purpose of this experiment

was to discover more about the nature of human information
processing in the courtroom.

Whether or not specific findings

in the experimental context are isomorphic to real world
occurrences, the theoretical perspective eventually gained
through research should apply to any context.
As expected, the nature of the crime presented to mock
jurors affected their verdict despite the fact that evidence
across conditions was highly similar.

A more legally and

emotionally severe set of crimes resulted in more guilty
47
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verdicts and higher assessments of degree of guilt, likeli
hood of guilt and suspicion.

While this crime deserved a

harsher sentence, no strong reason existed to link the defen
dant more to the incident.
The validity of this effect was further verified
through comanipulation of an eyewitness testimony factor.
Not only were jurors affected by the nature of the crime
factor but more so than they were by the ability of the key
eyewitness to accurately identify the suspect.

Thus even if

slight differences in evidence existed between crime condi
tions, this artifact was not likely to be responsible for
the crime severity effect when a powerful, intentionally manipu
lated evidence factor failed to produce results as strong.
Further analyses suggested an explanation of why the
nature of the crime influenced verdict.

In the severe crime

condition, jurors had stronger negative reactions toward the
suspect despite the fact that little reason existed to form
an impression of him.

Also the relationship between these

emotional reactions and verdict was stronger in this condi
tion.

These findings implied that jurors formed their impres

sion of the defendant based on the nature of the crime and
that this impression was somehow related to the differences
in verdict.

While the correlation between reactions to the

crime (Type II error orientation) and verdict was weak, path
analyses indicated that the emotional reaction toward the
defendant was indeed a strong mediator of this relationship;
a severe crime may have produced more negative feelings
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toward the defendant which resulted in more guilty verdicts.
These findings were particularly applicable to jurors render
ing guilty verdicts in the severe crime condition.
It appeared that jurors distorted their impressions
of the defendant based on the severity of the crime.

Evi

dence of information distortion could be seen in the selfreport data.

Jurors had extremely varied interpretations of

the same trial information and strongest differences appeared
between those convicting and those acquitting the defendant.
Verdict seemed to be based on the manner in which jurors
constructed trial information rather than on information
alone.

Further research may show how this subject construc

tion influences verdict across crime severity conditions.
Several models can be examined with these findings.
A weighted averaging approach (e.g., Kaplan and Kemmerick,
1974) would suggest that verdict differences occurred because
jurors combined various subjectively weighted units of trial
information to arrive at a verdict.

The nature of the crime

was one such unit having strong value.

Consequently, the

auto theft-hit and run crime received a more negative or
guilt oriented weighting and produced more convictions.

How

ever, examination of results on the whole indicated that
these processes were not occurring.

At no point did jurors

seem to consider crime severity as a factor.

Rather crime

severity seemed to affect the way jurors responded to other
aspects of the trial situation.

For example, jurors receiving

the severe crime had more negative emotional reactions toward
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the suspect.

These reactions then had a strong relationship

with verdict.
Furthermore, the weighted averaging approach works on
the assumption that each piece of evidence has a stable given
meaning to each juror.

The subjective importance of this

meaning then determines to what extent various units of evi
dence influence the verdict.

However, self-report data

showed that particular evidence had very different meanings
to various jurors and that these meanings seemed to be based
to a large extent on the context provided by other informa
tion.

If a weighted averaging approach is to work, component

predictors of the final outcome cannot come from the stimulus
material; they must come from jurors' interpretations of the
material.

While perhaps these conclusions appear prematurely

based on one artificially constructed trial situation, it
seems likely that the two-sided nature of the adversarial
trial would produce the variety of evidence interpretation .
found here.
A model combining reinforcement (Byrne end Clore, 1971)
and cognitive dissonance (Efran, 1974; Festinger, 1957) or
just world (Lerner, 1971) approaches fits the present data
fairly well.

Because the auto theft-hit and run crime in

volved the death of a woman and the crippling of her daughter,
it probably produced negative affect in jurors.
they convicted the defendant more often.

Consequently,

However, a fuller

understanding of the present data requires some sort of sup
plementary cognitive explanation such as just world or
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dissonance theory.

Jurors receiving the auto theft-hit and

run crime are faced with two fairly contradictory cognitions:
(1) the crime was strongly deserving of punishment, and
(2) the evidence linking the defendant to the crime

was not

that strong and so the defendant might not receive punish
ment.

Jurors unconsciously resolved this conflict by forming

more negative feelings toward the defendant and becoming more
suspicious of him.

They thus could find him guiltier and at

the same time not realize they were distorting the situation.
Furthermore, the interpretation of various units of evidence
could have been affected in a similar fashion by jurors'
desire to achieve some sort of consistency in their informa
tion processing.

Jurors finding the defendant guilty per

ceived the same facts in an entirely different fashion than
remaining jurors.

The nature of their interpretations was

clearly consistent with the verdict they had reached.
As with much research involving reinforcement or cog
nitive dissonance theory, post hoc explanations for the data
are not

refutable.

dictive

value.

However, these accounts have little

Furthermore, while they can explain

pre

any

specific trial outcome post hoc, they do not provide general
predictive principles.

For example, affective factors are

not the sole determinants of information distortion.

It

seems likely that a strong piece of evidence could change
jurors' interpretations of contradictory pieces independently
of its affective value.

In fact, almost all cases contain

a combination of affective and factual information.

At what
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point is one more salient than the other and how do the two
get processed together?

Secondly, trials often have strong

opposing affective factors.

The crime arouses affect which

works against the suspect while the potential penalty arouses
affect which works in the suspect's favor (e.g., Kerr, 1978;
Pepitone, 1975; Vidmar, 1972).
role in the final outcome?

How and when do each play a

These questions need to be an

swered in future research.
A statistical hypothesis testing model can also be
applied to the present findings and can address some of these
issues.

In any trial there are two possible mistakes a juror

can make; he/she can convict an innocent suspect (Type I
error) or acquit a guilty one (Type II error).

A more severe

crime increases the seriousness of each type of error because
jurors potentially risk both freeing a more dangerous criminal
and imposing a harsher penalty on an innocent suspect.
In the present situation however, the penalty was
probably minimized because sentencing was never mentioned.
As a result, the nature of the crime may have been a more
salient factor.

With the auto theft-hit and run case, there

fore, the Type II error was higher and the defendant was
found guilty more often very possibly because of the less
stringent alpha level set by jurors.

Vidmar (.1972) and Kerr

(1978) on the other hand, have tested cases where the poten
tial penalty was extremely salient.

Therefore as expected,

jurors were very much affected by the Type I error and, when
a harsher penalty was contingent upon conviction, more
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acquittals occurred probably as a result of a more stringent
alpha level.
However these processes alone could not account for
results.

If verdicts changed merely because of a criterion

shift, then ratings of likelihood of guilt should have been
similar across the severe and mild crime conditions, while
ratings of degree of guilt and verdict should have shown
differences.

In other words, jurors across conditions should

have arrived at the same estimate of the probability that the
defendant committed the crime.

However, their criterion point

for determining guilt may have differed across conditions and
they should have rendered more guilty verdicts where the cri
terion was lower (i.e., in the severe crime condition).

In

consistent with these predictions, findings indicated that
differences on the likelihood of guilt scales were significant.
Therefore, jurors were arriving at different interpretations
of the evidence across conditions, not merely matching similar
interpretations with a shifting criterion as Kerr (1978) sug
gests .
A more complete explanation might expand upon the sta
tistical hypothesis testing model.

Jurors do acquire a sense

of the Type I and Type II errors involved in the case and per
haps can shift their criterion of guilt.

This previous account

can be conceptualized as a subjective expectancy model
(Rotter, 1954).

Verdict choice is a function of the positive

and negative consequences of the decision times the proba
bility, given the evidence that the decision is correct.
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However, another important principle may operate.

The poten

tial consequences of each decision also may bias the way in
which jurors interpret evidence.

The more severe the Type I

error consequences of conviction seem, the more the juror
might interpret evidence in a way favorable to the suspect.
The more severe the Type II error consequences of acquittal
seem, the more he/she might interpret evidence in an unfavor
able way.

Thus, for example, when the consequences of the

Type II error seem high, the Type II error oriented juror
not only needs more evidence to convict, but may interpret
existing evidence in a benign fashion.

They might choose to

discount information against the defendant (Kelley, 1972).
The results of the experiment are consistent with this
model.

Jurors receiving the auto theft-hit and run crime

gave higher ratings on "importance of having the perpetrator
caught" and "anger at the crime."

Apparently, the Type II

error of acquitting a guilty suspect would be higher in this
condition.
Secondly, there is support for the supposition that
jurors can interpret information in a way more unfavorable
to the defendant with a more severe crime.

Ratings on "like

lihood of guilt" indicated that jurors across conditions did
draw different conclusions from the evidence.

Open ended

responses indicated that information was interpreted differ
ently across conditions with comments in the severe crime
condition being more unfavorable to the defendant.

The dis

tortion of information can be further illustrated with
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mediating variables assessing emotional reactions toward the
defendant.

These reactions were more negative in the severe

crime condition even though there was little personal informa
tion about the defendant to base them on.

The higher corre

lations between these mediating variables and verdict in the
severe crime condition indicated that ratings across these
dimensions were indeed consistent.

The leeway in evidence

interpretation can also be seen by examining open ended state
ments as a function of verdict.

Most jurors interpreted all

information in a fashion remarkably congruent to the verdict
they had reached.
Finally, path analysis showed some support for the
present model.

While the low correlation between Type II

error orientation and verdict makes conclusions tentative,
the three measured components fit the predicted model well.
The relationship between Type II error orientation and verdict
was strongly mediated by emotional evaluation of the defen
dant.

Furthermore, as would be expected, convicting jurors

in the severe crime condition most strongly exhibited this
pattern.

In future research, assessment of more concrete

information such as trial evidence, is expected to have a
similar mediating effect.
The present interpretation may be able to incorporate
and strengthen previous theory.

While effect and consistency

processes can influence verdict, the Type I-Type II error
orientation concept may be able to explain how and when these
factors work.

Details with affective value such as
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negativeness of the crime, likeability of the defendant and
seriousness of the sentence may all influence the Type IType II error orientation value.

Knowledge of this value

may allow a better understanding of how jurors process and
distort evidence.

Consistency seeking, for example, may be

one process causing information distortion which becomes
more predictable.

Jurors oriented toward avoiding Type II

errors will obtain consistency by minimizing information in
the defendant's favor, while those seeking to avoid Type I
errors will minimize information against the defendant.
Because distortion becomes a predictable process, information
integration models which consider the present viewpoint may
more successfully predict a greater variety of trial outcomes.
The present research suggests a model of juridic
decision making.

However, further research is needed to veri

fy the model and apply it to a variety of courtroom situations.
The effects of Type I-Type II errors on information processing
and emotional reactions toward the defendant must be further
examined.

Perhaps a clearer operationalization of Type I-

Type II error orientation may allow a better quantification
of the concept.

Instead of two cases, correlations between

Type I-Type II error orientation value, information interpre
tation and emotional reactions should be assessed across a
number of cases or variations of a case.

The effects of

Type I-Type II error orientation on verdict have been demon
strated in present and previous

(e.g., Kerr, 1978) research.

Future studies should examine the mediating effects of
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information distortion and emotional reactions on verdict.
Similarly, reactions to the defendant should be further tested
as mediating variables.
The various relationships suggested in the present
model are open to empirical investigation.

Perhaps when bet

ter established, a Type I-Type II error orientation model can
systematically explain how jurors respond to the complexity
of information present in the trial situation.

APPENDIX 1A
Case Stimuli for Severe Crime,
Incriminating Evidence Condition
Psychology and the Lav;— Juridic Decision Making
One of the basic principles of American democracy is
that any individual accused on a crime has the right to fair
and equitable judgement by peers.

This study, a joint effort

of lawyers and psychologists seeks to better understand juror
decision making by testing how a number of subjects react to
a case.

Your role in this study is to be a juror.

After read

ing a case, abbreviated to only present essential information,
you will be given scales assessing your verdict in the case
and various other reactions.

Read the case and answer the

questions as if you were really making a choice that would
affect society.
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Case #14 New York v. Wilson
Case Description
At 7:30 on the morning of January 19,1977, a Buick
Skylark was stolen.

The car had been parked on North Broad

way at the corner of Lake Avenue, a busy intersection in
Yonkers, New York.
tion of the car.

The owner had left the keys in the igni
Upon driving away, the perpetrator struck

Mrs. Robertson and her daughter who were crossing the street.
The mother was killed instantly and the daughter subsequently
paralyzed from the waist down.
A witness saw the crime and was able to give a descrip
tion of the perpetrator.

At 9:30 a.m., the stolen car was

discovered near a bus stop on 124th street and 7th avenue in
New York City.

The passenger side was badly damaged and the

headlight on that side was smashed.

Later reports confirmed

that the car had struck and glanced off a vehicle on the side
of the road.
A suspect fitting the description given by the witness
was picked up by police near the abandoned vehicle.

The

police read him his rights, then transferred him to Yonkers
where he was booked for hit and run driving and grand larceny
auto theft.
A grand jury indicted the suspect on April 24, 1977.
The defendant refused to plea bargain and trial was conducted
in Westchester County Court in White Plains on July 24, 1977.
Below are brief edited transcripts of the case.
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Case Transcript
prosecuting attorney: the state will prove that the accused,
Andre Wilson, was present at the scene of the crime, that he
stole a vehicle registered to Mr. Marchioni, that he will
fully steered the vehicle at two innocent bystanders and po
tential witnesses— resulting in the death of one and permanent
paralysis of the other, and that he then abandoned the vehicle
fifteen miles from the scene of the crime.
defense attorney: the defense will show that the state fails
to positively identify the accused as perpetrator of the
crime.

Obvious reason exists for this failure: the defendent

did not commit the crime.

A number of passersby could be

found with appearance and dress meeting the description given
of the offender and any could have stolen the car.

Mr.

Wilson was an innocent bystander accused of a crime due to
the circumstantial evidence of being found by the police in
the wrong place at the wrong time.
judge: prosecutor, call to the stand your first witness.
(note that all testimony in this case was eyewitness report
ing.

Fingerprints were not available; the crime occurred

on a cold January morning and it was possible given the
temperature that the criminal wore gloves.

No other

identifying evidence was found.)
prosecutor: Mrs. Mikkelson, please take the stand.

Mrs.

Mikkelson, you claim that you observed the crime occur on the
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morning of January 19th.

Could you describe what happened?

Mrs. Mikkelson; well— yes.

I saw a Black man run to Mr.

Marchioni's car.
prosecutor: so, you know Mr. Marchioni?
Mrs. Mikkelson: not that well, but I assume from the trial
that his car is the one we are talking about.
prosecutor: please continue.
Mrs. Mikkelson: Well... This man flung the car door open and
practically dove in.

Anyone could spot right away that some

thing funny was going on.
gas and took off.

Then this woman was crossing the street

with her little girl.
the car.

All of a sudden he stepped on the

She was watching the man take off in

He seemed to notice this and turned the car (sobbing).

prosecutor: yes, Mrs. Mikkelson?
Mrs. Mikkelson: and he turned the car right at them— hitting
both of them.
prosecutor: did you pay close attention to the crime?
M r s . Mikkelson: yes, because it was obvious that the car was
being stolen.
prosecutor: why were you out at 7:30 in the morning?
Mrs. Mikkelson: I babysit for the Kleins down the block.

Mr.
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Klein usually leaves for work at about 7:15.
down the street at Otis elevator.

The Mrs. works

She leaves at about 8:00,

but I come over to chat with her.
prosecutor: how close were you to the crime?
Mrs. Mikkelson: well,

when the man first ran to the

car, I

was pretty close, but

I got closer as he got in the

car.

I

didn't think he saw me, but I saw him.
prosecutor: so you were maybe 15 feet away when he committed
the crime.
defense: I object your honor; prosecution is leading the wit
ness.
judge: sustained.
prosecutor: how far were you from the crime?
M r s . Mikkelson: maybe

as far as from here to those steps

(points to courtroom steps about 25 feet away).
prosecutor: Is the man you saw present, in this courtroom?
Mrs. Mikkelson: he (points to the defendant)

looks like the one.

prosecutor: you were able to pick the suspect out of a police
lineup of fifteen suspects having similar appearance.

You

must be pretty sure of your opinion.
Mrs. Mikkelson: well, I saw his face from a distance but still
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don't think I could ever forget what he looked like.
prosecutor: the prosecution rests its case,
judge: defense may cross examine.
defense attorney: Mrs. Mikkelson, are you certain of the
identity of the suspect?
Mrs. Mikkelson: I did get a good look at him.
defense: about how long a look?
M r s . Mikkelson: maybe three seconds or so.
defense: and from a three second glance at 25 feet away, you
feel confident that you can positively identify the defendant.
Mrs. Mikkelson: that was the man I saw.
defense: are you sure?
Mrs. Mikkelson: well, I can't describe every feature on his
face; who could in my shoes?

But something about his appear

ance stands out in my mind.
defense: seems like you are fairly uncertain, Mrs. Mikkelson.
(objections follow and are sustained)
defense: no further questions.
prosecutor: The prosecution calls Officer Rashevsky to the
stand.
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prosecutor; Officer Rashevsky, you and your partner arrested
the suspect for suspicion of the crime in question on
January 19.

Is that correct?

Rashevsky; yes sir.
prosecutor: how did you become involved in the case?
Officer Rashevsky: we were patrolling our beat and saw a car
that appeared to have been in an accident.

We radioed in the

license number and headquarters informed us that the car had
been reported stolen.

They gave us a description of the sus

pect.
prosecutor: and did you find a suspect meeting the description
near the abandoned vehicle?
Rashevsky: yes sir.
prosecutor: is that man present in court
Rashevsky: yes sir, him (pointing to

today?

the defendant).

prosecutor: no further questions.
judge: the defense may cross examine.
defense: Officer Rashevsky, what was

the nature of the descrip

tion you used to arrest the suspect?
Officer Rashevsky: Black man, young, wearing jeans and a heavy
coat, average height, small build, wearing a brown scarf and
ski hat.

65

defense: you arrested the man in a heavily Black neighbor
hood.

He was wearing nothing that unusual.

Couldn't a

number of other suspects have met this description?
Rashevsky: It's possible.

But this suspect was the only man

in the general vicinity of the crime who came close to meeting
the description.

He looked suspicious and acted apprehen

sively when we approached him.
defense: and we are supposed to convict a man on your intui
tion.

Just how far was the suspect from the car when you

arrested him?
Rashevsky: about four blocks.
defense: no further questions.

Note that the defendant lived alone in Yonkers near
the scene of the crime.

No other witnesses were available

for either the prosecution or the defense.

The defendant was placed on the stand and denied
responsibility for the crime.

He claimed to have been on

his way to visit friends when picked up by the police.

As

he had not yet met with anyone there were no others to con
firm his alibi.

Turn to scales on next page.

APPENDIX IB
Mild Condition Manipulation
Case #14 New York v. Wilson
Case Description
At 7:30 on the morning of January 19, 1977, a Buick
Skylark was stolen.

The car had been parked on North Broad

way at the corner of Lake Avenue, a busy intersection in
Yonkers, New York.

The owner had left the keys in the igni

tion of the car.
A witness saw the crime and was able to give a descrip
tion of the perpetrator.

At 9:30 a.m., the stolen car was

discovered near a bus stop on 124th street and 7th avenue in
New York City.

The passenger side was badly damaged and the

headlight on that side was smashed.

Later reports confirmed

that the car had struck and glanced off a vehicle on the side
of the road.
A suspect fitting the description given by the witness
was picked up by police near the abandoned vehicle.

The

police read him his rights, then transferred him to Yonkers
where he was booked for grand larceny auto theft.
A grand jury indicted the suspect on April 24, 1977.
The defendant refused to plea bargain and trial was conducted
in Westchester County Court in White Plains on July 24, 1977.
Below are brief edited transcripts of the case.
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Case Transcript
prosecuting attorney: the state will prove that the accused,
Andre Wilson, was present at the scene of the crime, that he
willfully stole a vehicle registered to Mr. Marchioni and
that he then damaged and abandoned the vehicle fifteen miles
from the scene of the

crime.

defense attorney: the

defense will show that the

state fails

to positively identify the accused as perpetrator of the crime.
Obvious reason exists for this failure; the defendent did not
commit the crime.

A number of passersby could be found with

appearance and dress meeting the description given of the
offender and any could have stolen the car.
an innocent bystander

Mr. Wilson was

accused of a crime due to the circum

stantial evidence of being found by the police in the wrong
place at the wrong time.
judge: prosecutor, call to the stand your first witness.
(note that all testimony in this case was eyewitness re
porting.

Fingerprints were not available; the crime

occurred on a cold January morning and it was possible
given the temperature that the criminal wore gloves.
No other identifying evidence was found.)
prosecutor: Mrs. Mikkelson please take the stand.

Mrs.

Mikkelson, you claim that you observed the crime occur on the
morning of January 19.

Could you describe what happened?
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Mrs. Mikkelson: well— yes.

I saw a Black man run to Mr.

Marchioni's car.
prosecutor: so, you know Mr. Marchioni?
Mrs. Mikkelson: not that well, but I assume from the trial
that his car is the one we are talking about.
prosecutor: please continue.
Mrs. Mikkelson: Well... This man flung the car door open and
practically dove in.

Anyone could spot right away that some

thing funny was going on.
gas and took off.
space quickly.

All of a sudden he stepped on the

He had enough room to pull out of the

Lucky no one was coming the other way—

prosecutor: yes, Mrs. Mikkelson.
Mrs. Mikkelson: he went right through a red light.
prosecutor: did you pay close attention to the crime?
Mrs. Mikkelson: yes, because it was obvious that the car was
being stolen.
prosecutor: why were you out at 7:30 in the morning?
M r s . Mikkelson: I babysit for the Kleins down the block.
Klein usually leaves for work at about 7:15.
down the street at Otis elevator.
but I come over to

chat with her.

Mr.

The Mrs. works

She leaves at about 8:00,

APPENDIX 1C
Nonincriminating Eyewitness Testimony Manipulation

((Insert into page 63 of Appendix 1A))

judge: defense may cross examine.
defense attorney; Mrs. Mikkelson, are you certain as to the
identity of the suspect?
Mrs. Mikkelson: I did get a good look at him.
defense attorney: about how long a look?
Mrs. Mikkelson: maybe three seconds or so.
defense: and from a three second glance at about 25 feet
away you feel confident that you can positively identify
the defendant?
Mrs. Mikkelson: that man seems like the one I saw.
defense: are you sure?
Mrs. Mikkelson; well, I can't describe every feature on his
face; who could in my shoes?

But something about his appear

ance stands out in my mind.
defense: then why were you not able to identify the defendant
in a police lineup?
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Mrs. Mikkelson; They dressed them up to look so much alike.
But when the defendant is alone like this, I can tell.
defense: what if an imposter were here today in court?
Could you tell that he was not the suspect?
prosecutor: I object your honor.
judge: objection sustained.

APPENDIX ID
Nonincriminating Location Manipulation

Note that the defendant lived alone in New York City.
No other witnesses were available for either the prosecution
,or the defense.

The defendant was placed on the stand and denied
responsibility for the crime.

He claimed to have been on

his way to visit friends when picked up by the police.
he had not yet met with anyone, there were no others to
confirm his alibi.

Turn to scales on next page.
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APPENDIX 2
Dependent Measures
1) Circle either A or B. Did you find the defendent innocent
or guilty of committing the crime?
A) innocent

B) guilty

2) Circle a number indicating your judgement of the defendant's
degree of guilt.
-5
-4
absolutely
not guilty

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4
5
absolutely
guilty

3) Describe your emotional reaction to the defendant using the
following scales:
a) How angry did you feel toward the defendent?
0
1
2
not at
all
angry

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
extremely
angry

b) How much sympathy did you feel for the defendent?
0
1
2
no sympathy
at all

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
a great deal
of sympathy

c) How threatening did you find the defendant?
0
1
2
not at
all
threatening

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
extremely
threatening

d) How suspicious were you of the defendant?
0
1
not at
all
suspicious

2

3

4

5
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6

7

8

9

10
extremely
suspicious
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e) How much did you personally dislike the defendant?
0
1
2
did not
dislike him
at all

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
disliked him
strongly

4) How important do you think it is to have the perpetrator
of this crime caught and prosecuted?
0
1
not at all
important

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
extremely
important

9

10
extremely
angry

5) How angry does a crime of this nature make you?
0
1
not at all
angry

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

6) How likely do you think it was that the defendant committed
the crime?
0%
10%
not at all
likely

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%
100%
extremely
likely
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7) Please assign a whole
number to represent the
seriousness of the crime
you have read about.
To the right is a table
giving you a list of
crimes with their
seriousness ratings
(assigned by a large
sample of people across
the country). Select
a seriousness rating
by judging where the
present crime would fit
on this table.
Write your number in
the box below.

Seriousness
Ratings

Sample
Crimes

0
5-

10.
15"
20 *

-marijuana smoking
-assault-no injury
-possession of heroin
-$1000 larceny
-tax evasion ($10,000)
-$10,000 theft

25-------- assault - doctor needed
30
-stabbing-no treatment
35.

-assault-hospitalization
needed

40.

-murder through reckless.,
. ,
ness
-attempted rape
-armed robbery

45"

50-------- rape - no injury

■rape - hospitalization
needed
65
70

-------- bombing resulting in
death

75-------- single intentional murder
80
85
90

100
■rape and murder
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8) How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following
reasons for sending the perpetrator of this crime to jail?
a) to isolate him from society
-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

b) to discourage others from committing the same crime
-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

c) to discourage the offender from doing it again
-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

4

5

d) to rehabilitate the offender
-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

e) to punish the offender
-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

f) no reason exists for putting a person in jail
-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

9) The following questions pertain to Mrs. Mikkelson, the first
witness.
a) Was Mrs. Mikkelson able to pick the defendant out
of a police lineup?
A) yes

B) no

b) To what extent did you believe her testimony?
0
1
not at all

2

3

4

5

6.

7

8

9
10
a great deal

c) How important was her testimony in helping you reach
a verdict?
0
1
not at all
important

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
extremely
important
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10) The following questions pertain to the location of the
crime.
a) Where did the defendant reside?

b) Where

(write in answer) -

(what city) was the car stolen? -

c) In what way did the defendant's place of residence
influence the likelihood that he committed the crime?
-5
-4
-3
it made
it much
less likely

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5
it made
it much
more likely

11) In the space provided below please indicate specifically
and in detail the reason for your verdict and explain what
factors tended to lead you to see the defendant as more
innocent or guilty.
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